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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 3, Number 13 (September 16, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin weakened but Constitutional Change unresolved 
Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov must have been as giddy as 
Yabloko chief Grigori Yavlinsky over his role in preventing the return of Viktor 
Chernomyrdin as prime minister -- giddy enough not to realize they surrendered 
the war in order to win a battle. In the midst of negotiations over Chernomyrdin's 
candidacy, President Yel'tsin was eventually compelled to agree to a power-
sharing pact that would drain substantial authority from the executive branch and 
create a closer parity between executive and legislative powers. 
 
Among the more salient elements of the accord was a provision that would 
require Yel'tsin to consult with the Duma before making any ministerial 
appointments (not just the power ministries), seek confirmation of appointments 
by the Duma, and prevent the dismissal of ministers (by the prime minister) 
without Duma approval. (ITAR-TASS, 1327 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-250). 
This would clearly serve to make the creation of a government, and subsequently 
control over policy, a joint enterprise between the president and parliament. 
 
What has, in fact, occurred since the confirmation of Yevgeni Primakov as prime 
minister is the resumption of a familiar pattern of governmental appointments: 
Primakov selects the ministers and Yel'tsin appoints them through the power of 
decree. If President Yel'tsin has been weakened by the recent crisis, and he 
most assuredly has been, it is in relation to the strength of the government, 
specifically a more authoritative prime minister, and not, at least procedurally, in 
relation to the legislature. 
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Have Zyuganov and Yavlinsky realized the folly of their ways? Both leaders have 
rejected the possibility of participation in the government on behalf of their parties 
(Communist Yuri Maslyukov is a notable exception, discussed below) and 
renewed their opposition tactics. (Moscow Times, 15 Sep 98; nexis) Zyuganov 
has also, this week, called for implementation of the power-sharing accord. 
Whether or not it is already too late to revive this agreement will have to wait for 
future developments. It does appear, however, that whether by design or fool's 
luck, Yel'tsin has reserved for himself the possibility for yet another comeback. 
 
APPARAT 
Personnel replacements commence 
Whenever a new authority figure emerges in the Russian executive -- either in 
the Kremlin or government -- personnel changes are sure to follow. It is often an 
important moment for Kremlinologists as it serves to elucidate the relationships 
and alliances among Russia's leading officials. In this spirit, the first few days of 
the Primakov premiership have been no disappointment. 
 
Among the first to be dismissed were Presidential Press Secretary and Deputy 
Chief of Staff Sergei Yastrzhembsky and Security Council Secretary Andrei 
Kokoshin. There had been some debate over the relationship between Primakov 
and Yastrzhembsky, but his dismissal (without transfer to another significant 
post) would suggest that Primakov was displeased with the press secretary's 
independence in making foreign policy statements, as well as his access to 
Yel'tsin.  
 
Some analysts have interpreted these dismissals as a result of their support for 
Luzhkov in the Chernomyrdin confirmation battle. According to this line of 
thought, Yastrzhembsky and Kokoshin drew the ire of Chief of Staff Yumashev 
and Tatiana Dyachenko, who engineered their ouster. (Moscow Times, 15 Sep 
98; nexis) While this is possible, it seems unlikely that the greatly weakened 
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Yel'tsin protectors could have influenced these personnel decisions without the 
support of Primakov. 
 
Replacing Kokoshin as secretary of the Security Council is General Nikolai 
Bordyuzha, the head of the Border Guards Service. Yastrzhembsky's 
replacement, Dmitri Yakushkin, has worked most recently for Russian Television 
and is a descendant of a Decembrist revolutionary. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Sep 98; 
nexis) Other Kremlin personnel news: Presidential foreign policy adviser Sergei 
Prikhodko has been appointed deputy chief of the president's staff; so too has 
Andrei Voloshin. (ITAR-TASS, 14 Sep 98; nexis) Oleg Syusev, former deputy 
prime minister, has also been transferred to the Kremlin as a deputy chief of 
staff. (Agence-France Presse, 16 Sep 98; nexis) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Chernomyrdin withdraws, Primakov confirmed as prime minister 
Despite a vote of support (91-17) from the Federation Council in a constitutionally 
irrelevant but strategically elegant maneuver, Viktor Chernomyrdin's candidacy 
could not survive the onslaught of opposition from, most notably, the Communist 
Party and Yabloko. While the involvement of the regional leaders from the 
Federation Council would have marked a true turning point in Russian federative 
relations, Duma leaders asserted their authority in the confirmation of a prime 
minister and repeatedly rejected Chernomyrdin.  
 
As the president and Duma settled on a compromise candidate, Chernomyrdin 
withdrew his candidacy and addressed the nation in a likely attempt to salvage 
public support in preparation for his presidential bid in 2000. A chest-thumping 
patriotism characterized the speech: "... I think that if today, at this stage, 
Chernomyrdin has become a stumbling block, that Chernomyrdin is bringing 
discord -- I give up my powers, I cannot be the person to harm Russia. I will not 
do so because I am a true Russian -- in my roots, in my whole being, all the long 
way that I have come from being a metal worker to the highest government 
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position -- I feel this with all my being, with all my life experience." (Reuters, 10 
Sep 98; Johnson's Russia List, 10 Sep 98) 
 
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov was nominated by the Yabloko Party as an 
alternative to Chernomyrdin. Vladimir Lukin, a Yabloko deputy and foreign policy 
analyst, is the likely link between Primakov and Yabloko's Yavlinsky. Usually in 
Russian policy an individual's nomination to office implies the candidate's interest 
in obtaining the position, but it is unclear that Primakov sought or willingly 
accepted the post of prime minister. Certainly his public statements suggested 
otherwise.  
 
With foreign policy one of the only fields in which Russia has a persuasive voice 
and meaningful role to play, Primakov's decision to accept the prime ministerial 
nomination and (nominally) separate himself from foreign policy suggests near 
career suicide. Unfortunately, an elaboration of Primakov's motivations in this 
governmental crisis is not likely to be made explicit in the near future. 
 
On Friday, 11 September, the State Duma easily confirmed Yevgeni Primakov as 
prime minister by a vote of 315-63. (Moscow Times, 15 Sep 98; nexis) 
Primakov's complete ministerial roster is still in development, but thus far the 
following appointments appear to be secure: 
 
In the power ministries, MVD Chief Stepashin, Defense Minister Sergeev and 
Emergencies Minister Shoigu will be retaining their posts. (Moscow Times, 15 
Sep 98) The recently appointed head of the FSB, Vladimir Putin, who is closely 
identified with Anatoli Chubais, is rumored to be on his way out, to be replaced 
by Valentin Sobolev, the current deputy director of the FSB's Anti-Terrorism 
Department. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Sep 98; Russian Press Digest/nexis); 
 
Yuri Maslyukov has been named, by presidential decree, as first deputy prime 
minister in charge of economic policy. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Sep 98; nexis) 
 5 
Maslyukov, it may be recalled, is the one Communist deputy who agreed to serve 
in the Kirienko government in July 1998 (See previous Digest). Although CP 
leader Zyuganov has rejected the idea of participation of members of his party in 
the new government, Maslyukov continues to act independently in this regard;  
 
Acting Chief of the Government Staff Igor Shabdurasulov has been replaced by 
former Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Zubakov. Zubakov has most recently been 
involved in consular negotiations in Israel. (Interfax, 19 Aug 98; nexis) 
Shabdurasulov, said to have played a key role in the Chernomyrdin nomination, 
has been nominated, by presidential decree, to the Berezovsky-controlled ORT 
and awaits final approval by the Board of Directors. (Moscow Times, 15 Sep 98; 
nexis); 
 
Viktor Gerashchenko, former head of the Central Bank, has been tapped to 
reprise the role by Yel'tsin. His nomination is subject to Duma confirmation, which 
is expected this week. (Interfax, 1016 GMT, 11 Sep 98; nexis); 
 
Alexandr Shokhin, head of the Duma faction of Chernomyrdin's NDR, has been 
named a deputy prime minister, tasked with the financial portfolio. (Agence-
France Presse, 1146 GMT, 15 Sep 98; nexis) On 16 September, Shokhin also 
replaced Anatoli Chubais as liaison to international financial organizations. (AFX-
Exxtel News, 16 Sep 98; nexis); 
 
Also from NDR, Vladimir Ryzhkov has been appointed as deputy prime minister 
in charge of social issues and Vladimir Bulgak, the acting science minister and 
longtime communications minister, has been elevated to deputy prime minister 
with the science and technologies portfolio. (Agence-France Presse, 16 Sep 98; 
nexis); 
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Igor Ivanov, former deputy foreign minister, has been named the new foreign 
minister. Ivanov's previous experience is in the European Department of the 
foreign ministry with a specialty in Spain. (Interfax, 1016 GMT, 11 Sep 98; nexis); 
 
and Mikhail Sinelin has been named head of the Secretariat for the first deputy 
prime minister (Maslyukov). Sinelin appears to have a long working relationship 
with Maslyukov. (ITAR-TASS, 14 Sep 98; NEXIS) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah K. Miller 
 
Russia maintains position on Kosovo  
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Russian reporters in Belgrade on 4 
September that Russia still believes NATO would only be deepening the existing 
problems in Kosovo with the use of force. Ivanov, in Belgrade to deliver a letter 
from President Boris Yel'tsin to President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Slobodan Milosevic, told reporters that now it was vital to solve all issues 
pertaining to a return of Kosovo-Metohija refugees to their homes before the 
beginning of winter. Ivanov said that Yel'tsin's letter concerned the 
implementation of his agreement with President Milosevic reached in Moscow on 
16 June, with a special emphasis on the humanitarian aspect of the Kosovo-
Metohija problem. Ivanov also stated that in his reply to Yel'tsin's letter, Milosevic 
expressed assurances that all Yugoslav and Serbian authorities guaranteed the 
safety and unhampered return of all persons who had temporarily left their 
homes in Kosovo-Metohija. (Tanjug, 2125 GMT, 4 Sep 98; FBIS-EEU-98-248)  
 
Ivanov's statements came on the same day that Russian Ambassador to the UN 
Sergei Lavrov denied reports that Moscow would back a UN resolution for 
military intervention in Kosovo in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. 
Responding to German press reports, Lavrov stated that there had been no 
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change in the Russian position, which he noted had been spelled out in Bonn at 
a six-nation "Contact Group" meeting on 8 July. He also said that there were no 
discussions on a UN draft resolution providing for the use of force in the southern 
Yugoslav province. "There is no resolution," said Lavrov.(Agence-France Presse, 
North European Service, 1529 GMT, 4 Sep 98; FBIS-EEU-98-248) 
 
Russian-India defense ties termed a 'sovereign right' 
During a Moscow briefing on 8 September, Russian foreign ministry spokesman 
Vladimir Rakhmanin reiterated Moscow's intention to maintain strong military and 
defense-technology ties with India, stating that the "bilateral cooperation in 
defense is Russia's and India's sovereign right and nobody intends to curtail it." 
Rakhmanin, referring to the Joint Statement of the Russian and US presidents 
"On the Common Challenges to Security at the Threshold of the XXI Century" 
signed during President Bill Clinton's recent visit to Moscow, emphasized that 
Russia's contacts with India in the sphere of defense was not stipulated in either 
this document or elsewhere during the summit. (ITAR-TASS, 1512 GMT, 8 Sep 
98; FBIS-TAC-98-251) 
 
These statements were issued just three days after a prominent Indian 
newspaper published an editorial stating that American pressure on Russia to 
curtail military cooperation with India was a "Hostile Act Against India." Among 
many other claims, the editorial said that Moscow needs to maintain its existing 
defense deals with New Delhi out of financial necessity. (The Pioneer, 3 Sep 98, 
p. 8; FBIS-TAC-98-248) 
 
Requests for international aid bypass Moscow 
Several areas in Russia have apparently requested food assistance from the 
Nordic countries as the ongoing economic crisis in Russia has persisted with no 
end in sight. Arkhangelsk and the Kaliningrad enclave have requested help, said 
Bjorn Rosengren, the governor of the Swedish province of Norrbotten. Yuri 
Evdikomov, the governor general of Murmansk, telephoned his colleagues in 
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northern Sweden, Norway, and Finland to get them to meet regional food deficits 
in Murmansk. Governor Rosengren stated that a panic situation does not exist 
now but that one could develop in the next two weeks. 
 
At the same time there have been reports that need is emerging in the militarized 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic. According to the Danish media, 
Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen is contemplating sending 
emergency assistance to Kaliningrad. Additionally on 7 September Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari said that Finland and the EU should prepare 
emergency food shipments to Russia for the elderly and children. (Politiken, 10 
Sep 98; FBIS-WEU-98-253) 
 
These latest reported requests for humanitarian assistance mark another 
element of regional cooperation with foreign powers that bypasses Moscow. 
 
Tehran daily urges Russia to adopt 'clear policy' on Iran 
Referring to the recent visit by US President Bill Clinton to Moscow, and the 
announcement that three Russian companies were asked to stop cooperation 
with Iran, the English daily Iran News on 7 September suggested Russia adopt a 
clear policy towards Iran stressing that the imposition of and participation in 
embargoes would be to the disadvantage of Russia alone. The daily stressed 
that the three companies already had been barred from cooperating with Tehran 
under the D'Amato law, claiming that these latest US remarks were just a 
repetition of its stance against Iran and its aim to tarnish Russia-Iran ties. 
 
The article also implied that it was in the best interest of Moscow to cooperate 
with Tehran "in view of the grave circumstances prevailing in the region," an 
apparent reference to the growing tensions between Iran and Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan. (IRNA, 0827 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-NES-98-250) Russia has long 
opposed Taliban control of Afghanistan and has repeatedly been accused of 
assisting anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. 
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Relations with China, Japan weather the Russian crisis 
With cautious reactions, China and Japan proved that their attention is fixed on 
developments in Russia. Both countries have voiced support for an economically 
sound, politically stable Russia. Toward that goal, Japan approached Tony Blair 
about convening a G-7 summit to discuss Russia's economic and political crises. 
(Kyodo, 1011 GMT, 31 Aug 98; FBIS-EAS-98-243) Furthermore, at the 
inauguration of the new Japan-Russia Friendship Forum, Japan signaled a 
measure of optimism. Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated that "There 
is no change whatsoever in the policy of doing our best to conclude a peace 
treaty by 2000." Mr. Obuchi added that he will travel to Russia in November to 
work on the peace treaty. (Kyodo, 1158 GMT, 9 Sep 98; FBIS-EAS-98-252)  
 
Chinese-Russian relations also appear to have remained on track, albeit with a 
certain dose of caution. Initially President Jiang Zemin's September visit to 
Moscow was indefinitely postponed, but last week the trip was rescheduled for 
sometime in October. (ITAR-TASS, 1433 GMT, 2 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-245) 
Calling China a "friendly neighbor," a foreign ministry spokesman in Beijing 
expressed his country's desire to ensure that "Sino-Russian relations can 
continue to develop." (Xinhua 1536 GMT, 1 Sep 98; FBIS-CHI-98-244) In light of 
the successful completion of the demarcation project on the Russian-Chinese 
border and news reports of a possible $540 million in Chinese financial 
assistance to Russia, it seems that Sino-Russian relations are well on their way. 
(Interfax, 1506 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-250)  
 
With some success in improving relations with China and Japan, Russia 
announced it will now strive "to develop with the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea goodneighborly relations based on mutual respect" as well. (ITAR-TASS, 
1314 GMT, 8 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-251) It is unclear how Russia's new friends 
will react to that venture. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Affairs and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma passes resolution calling for Yel'tsin's resignation 
During its extraordinary session the State Duma passed a resolution demanding 
President Boris Yel'tsin's immediate resignation. In all, 245 deputies voted for the 
resolution, 32 against, with no abstentions. The resolution is not binding. 
 
The impeachment process continues, however, with 225 delegates having 
signed the requisite documents in support of Yel'tsin's removal; 300 signatures 
are required to initiate the process. Support seems to be building around the 
country for Yel'tsin's resignation, and with the president's latest sacking of the 
government, the unconvinced may decide that Yel'tsin's better days are now 
behind him and a new leader is necessary. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1056 
GMT, 21 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-233) 
 
REGIONS 
Russian regional leaders view government dismissal 
Regional support for the return of former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was 
high. The primary reason was the desired need for economic and political 
stability. According to an article from an unnamed Nizhny Novgorod journal 
published in Rossiyskaya gazeta, Kirienko's dismissal was not caused by the 
machinations of wealthy power brokers, it was simply that Kirienko was 
threatening to effect real reform, which Yel'tsin worried would lead to social 
unrest. Apparently it was Yel'tsin's desire for stability over reform which brought 
Chernomyrdin back to Moscow, and which eventually led to the nomination and 
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subsequent approval by the Duma of ex-foreign minister Y. Primakov to the post 
of prime minister. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 29 Aug 98, pp. 3, 6; FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
 
The Duma speaker of the Maritime Territory expressed relief at Kirienko's 
dismissal because of the prime minister's overly harsh economic reforms, but 
noted that the office of the prime minister needed to be invested with greater 
powers over the cabinet as well as policy formulation, and it should be more 
responsible to the Federal Assembly. This attitude seems to be generally felt 
across the country. (ITAR-TASS, 0713 GMT, 24 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-236)  
 
However, as of this writing, it is not clear how the regions feel about Y. Primakov 
as prime minister, a situation in which stability rather than reform is the promise, 
presuming an economic meltdown can be stopped by executive fiat. It seems 
that one, if not the only, reason Russian democracy has managed to exhibit 
moments of popular sovereignty and democratic accountability in the last few 
years is that the conduits to power have not yet reified, and thus cannot be 
controlled or dominated by any one section or institution of society. This is largely 
due to the political chaos in Moscow, where the former centralized state has 
given way to a much looser assortment of local and regional power centers. 
However, if his past is any guide, Prime Minister Primakov will do his best to stop 
this process.  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Dictatorship of the constitution: Zyuganov the democrat? 
In a radio call-in show, CPRF leader and chief officer of Boris Yel'tsin's not-so-
loyal opposition in the Duma, Gennadi Zyuganov admitted that the solution to 
recent economic and political crises needed to be found within the existing 
constitution. 
 
In responding to a caller's doubts that demonstrations will bring about Yel'tsin's 
removal from office, Zyuganov replied, "I assure you, if 25-30 million people take 
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to the streets [Yel'tsin] and his clique will be forced to go. We must under no 
circumstances allow carnage to occur Only well-organized social protest initiated 
by the impeachment procedure and supported by the regions, strike committees, 
and mass action can save Russia from disintegration today and save the people 
from repression and genocide." 
 
When asked if he thought bloodshed would be required, Zyuganov cautioned that 
"the change of power can be carried out bloodlessly only under the auspices of 
the legislature, it has the constitutional right to do this. We must introduce into the 
constitution around 15 amendments to limit the president's sovereignty. We must 
redistribute these powers among a strong and effective government, but under 
the control of the Federal Assembly, to ensure that the government is 
accountable to it." 
 
But the media, Zyuganov warns, needs to have its impartiality attend to by 
"observer councils" presumably set up in each media outlet around the country. 
A re-nationalization of the media is also not out of the question because, after all, 
only the people's government can provide for non-biased reporting. Deja vu all 
over again? (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 Aug 98, p 2; FBIS-SOV-98-239) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Michael K. Reardon and LCDR Fred Drummond 
 
'Loose Missile' apprehended in the Czech Republic 
After a year-long investigation, a Russian identified as only "AK" was arrested 
about 100 miles south of Prague on charges of selling nearly 400 items of heavy 
military equipment to China, North Korea and Slovakia. He allegedly had been 
illegally selling his wares -- Tatra heavy trucks adapted for carrying missile 
launchers and bridging equipment -- from 1992-1997. (Agence-France Presse, 
North European Service, 0000 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-EEU-98-248) Considering 
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the devaluation of the ruble, the arrest came at the most inopportune time for the 
receiving countries who were probably poised for some bargain basement deals. 
 
Once burned up -- twice shy 
Problems continued to plague satellite launches for Strategic Missile Troops 
again this month (see Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 10) as a Zenith-2 booster 
carrying 12 commercial satellites aborted its mission shortly after blast-off 
Thursday, 10 September, and came crashing back to Earth in an uninhabited 
area in Khakasia (southern Siberia). This failure, which follows on the footsteps 
of multiple delays and improper launchings in June and July, resulted in the total 
loss of the 12 American "Globalstar" communication satellites aboard the vessel. 
Adapted from former Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, the two-stage 
Zenith-2 rockets are designed and produced by the Pivdenne Bureau and 
Pivdenmash plant in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. The crash has already been 
traced to two computer faults that affected the functioning of the boosters. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 11 Sep 98) 
 
The Zenith-2 rocket blasted off just after midnight Friday morning. The liftoff 
passed smoothly. However, an emergency cut-off of the second stage engine 
took place 272 seconds later. At that point, the rocket and payload dropped to 
Earth in a specially set area of southern Siberia. Officials at the Russian Space 
Agency relayed that the emergency command was given in the control system 
and the engines of the Zenith rocket shut down. At the time of the shutdown, the 
rocket had already passed through the dense layers of the atmosphere and was 
in space. Therefore, it had cast off the nose fairing which protects the satellites 
from high temperatures. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0602 GMT, 10 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-253) This would logically result in the burnup of the launch vehicle 
and satellites upon re-entry. The satellites were filled with fuel for maneuvering in 
space, which may have also added to their demise. 
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The launch was the first in a series of three. It represents a joint Russian-
Ukrainian contribution to the Globalstar consortium's program to put 36 
commercial communication satellites into orbit by the end of 1999. Led by the US 
company Loral, the consortium includes additional US as well as French, 
German, British, Italian and South Korean firms. It plans two further Zenith-2 
launches from Baikonur in October and December. That plan is now under 
serious question. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 11 Sep 98) Though the terms 
of the launch contract have not been released, the launch was estimated to cost 
about $30 million. The launch was fully insured and the insurance will fully 
compensate the Americans for the loss of the satellites. (ITAR-TASS, 1244 GMT, 
10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-253) 
 
There's a lot of "finger-pointing" going on to determine blame for this one. The 
head of the Russian Space Agency press service, Vyacheslav Mikhailichenko, 
was quick to state, "The launching was considered Ukrainian responsibility, the 
Russian side exercised only general coordination of work under the project." 
Pivdenmash management pointed out that an institute in Moscow produced the 
malfunctioning computer. Pivdenne management, while admitting to "a great 
blow to the Bureau and to Ukraine," noted that the Russian Soyuz rocket failed in 
13 out of 30 launches, compared to a failure rate of 8 out of 29 launches for 
Ukraine's Zenith-1 and Zenith-2 rockets. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 11 
Sep 98) 
 
Just another day at the office 
Recently, the Russian ministries of defense and internal affairs have been 
working hard to calm fears that their respective forces are in a state of 
heightened readiness around the capital given the aggravated sociopolitical 
situation in the country. Responding to claims by the mass media, the defense 
minister's press secretary, Gen. Anatoli Shatalov, stated, "No orders have been 
given [to concentrate] troops around the capital. All units are stationed in the 
usual places and engaged in routine training." (Interfax, 0744 GMT, 4 Sep 98; 
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FBIS-SOV-98-248). An interior ministry spokesman defended the agency's troop 
activities by stating they "are doing their routine jobs in aiding the interior 
agencies in protecting law and order in the capital and around it. No unusual 
steps are being taken, the patrols have not been reinforced." (Interfax, 0744 
GMT, 4 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248, and Rossiskaya gazeta, 8 Sep 98, p. 1; 
FBIS-SOV-98-250) 
 
Well, it's comforting to receive such assurances that nothing ominous or unique 
is occurring which would be reminiscent of events in the capital a few years ago. 
And as further proof, Commander-in-chief of the Airborne Force Georgy Shpak, 
when queried about a recent exercise, said that neither the president nor the 
defense minister gave him any special instructions to conduct certain "planned 
maneuvers." He simply said, "The force remains in its usual position of full alert." 
(Interfax, 1008 GMT, 8 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-252) 
 
Apparently, while pilots are getting only 10 to 20 percent of their required flight 
training, defense equipment and facility maintenance and repair are barely (if at 
all), being accomplished and most of the military is not even being paid, Shpak 
has been able to save up enough of the Airborne Forces' budget to conduct 
these "planned maneuvers"... and at this particular time. 
 
Working towards a common goal 
On 3 September, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev attended a combined 
air defense exercise which brought together the forces of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The exercise, code-named Combat 
Commonwealth '98, involved 1,000 troops and 42 fixed and rotary wing aircraft. 
Sergeev said, "It was the first time that [these four countries'] air defense forces 
interacted in a training session." Sergeev also handed Kazakh officers a symbolic 
key to an S-300 air defense system that Russia had handed over to Kazakhstan. 
(Interfax, 1245 GMT, 3 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-246) 
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Base realignment and closure, Russian-style  
Like the United States military, the armed forces of Russia are closing unneeded 
bases, with the hope of reducing operating costs. Part of this process includes 
selling off the military property on those bases, with the goal of then putting much 
of the generated revenue towards the payment of back wages of servicemen. To 
put it bluntly, the process is not working. 
 
Several related reasons are responsible for this failure. First, the number and 
pace of base closings have greatly exceeded the involved ministries' abilities to 
sell any of the property, either real estate or material on the bases. Already over 
800 bases have been closed, with another 700 scheduled to be vacated (due to 
the tenant units being disbanded) within the next year. Moreover, the military 
budget has no room in it to maintain or even guard the closed posts, so that, in 
the words of the reporter from Obshchaya gazeta, the "...citizens, seeing 
ownerless structures, are increasingly satisfying their material needs there." In 
other words, the posts are being looted on a grand scale. The two primary 
players in the property sale process are the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry 
for Management of State Property.  
 
Despite the Judge Advocate's Office beginning criminal proceedings in a limited 
number of cases, there does not appear to be any solution in sight to stop the 
loss of millions of rubles from non-use and theft. The sheer number of closed 
facilities is overwhelming the bureaucracy. (Obshchaya gazeta, 20-26 Aug 98, p. 
2; FBIS-SOV-98-245)  
 
Can the US help the Russians in this regard though? Recently, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen offered American assistance, in the form of lessons 
learned instead of monetary aid, in the armed forces' downsizing effort. 
Unfortunately for the Russians, the American examples of converting unneeded 
military facilities to civilian use (and profitability) are not necessarily directly 
applicable to their situation. For instance, many of the closed US bases are 
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located in prime real estate markets, and/or involve air bases that are easily 
converted to civilian use (i.e., those located in areas that have a market demand 
for expanded commercial air operations). However, US military assistance and 
advice to the former Soviet Union is not limited to the sale and disposal of 
installations. The US Navy recently assisted the Georgian navy, in conjunction 
with a port visit of the flagship USS LaSalle, in developing its naval staff and 
infrastructure. (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 Sep 98) So, perhaps assistance in Russia's 
downsizing efforts is not an unrealistic possibility. 
 
Dissatisfaction turns deadly, again 
The most recent, and dramatic, example of military personnel dissatisfaction 
occurred in the Northern Fleet at the Skalisty naval base near Murmansk. On 11 
September, a 19-year-old conscript sailor opened fire on his shipmates, killing 
eight persons, while barricading himself on an Akula-class (NATO reporting 
name) attack submarine. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 11 Sep 98) A 
pyschologist, a priest, and the sailor's mother were brought in during attempts at 
negotiation, but after 23 hours the conscript killed himself just as Federal Security 
Service personnel were to overtake him. (Moscow Times, 12 Sep 98, and The 
Bellona Report, 1998-09-12) 
 
This is just another in a long string of military personnel, both officer and enlisted, 
reaching a breaking point. Of concern was that, in this case, the incident took 
place on a nuclear-powered Russian submarine. The Akula-class SSN is an 
attack-cruise missile platform, and not a strategic ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN); however, it is capable of carrying nuclear-tipped tactical weapons. There 
was no indication that such weapons were on board, although apparently there 
were conventionally armed torpedos loaded. Ships moored nearby were moved 
and the immediate area next to the pier was evacuated as Russian authorities 
reacted to the sailor's threat to explode a torpedo. (St. Petersburg Times, 12 Sep 
98, Bellona Report, 1998-09-12 and BBC World Report, 1114 GMT, 12 Sep 98) 
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The Bellona and the BBC reports differed on what prompted the sailor's actions; 
however, this incident fits a general pattern of discontent within virtually all the 
branches of the Russian armed forces. Most military members are owed months 
of backpay, many units are reported to be underfed, and morale overall is very 
low. Combined with the often brutal treatment of conscripts, incidents such as 
this are regrettable, but not surprising. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Summit postponed, cooperation continues 
The 10 September meeting of Customs Union members (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus) plus Tajikistan was abruptly called off by the Russian 
government on 7 September. Although the meeting was officially postponed, 
neither a new date nor a reason for the postponement was specified. Topics 
were to include the signature of the Customs Union treaty and the formation of a 
council for border matters. It was indicated that the closed session was to include 
discussion of the crises in Afghanistan and Russia. (Interfax, 1929 GMT, 28 Aug 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-240)  
 
Despite this cancellation, CIS border security efforts continued with the 
completion of the joint Military Partnership-98 Air Defense Exercises. (Interfax, 
0837 GMT, 29 Aug 98; FBIS-UMA-98-241) For his efforts, the commander of a 
Kyrgyz Air Defense regiment received an engraved watch from Russian Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeev as well as the information that, effective immediately, his 
regiment was assigned to combat duty protecting CIS external borders. 
(Vecherniy Bishkek, 8 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-252) Support for the use of CIS 
troops to guard their external borders has been strong from Central Asian states, 
given the external threat that countries such as Afghanistan present. In a radio 
address, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov pledged support for these efforts, 
 19 
saying that "under the collective security agreement...Tajikistan will along with 
[the CIS] strengthen its southern borders...[and] make our contribution in order to 
settle the Afghan problem as soon as possible." (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 19 
Aug 98, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-98-238) Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev said the "CIS 
should work out unanimous and decisive counter-actions against Islamic 
fundamentalism to prevent political and economic destabilization in Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and other CIS states." (Interfax, 1548 GMT, 3 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-247) 
As part of these efforts, Russia has said that it will absorb the training costs of 
1,000 servicemen from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all of 
which have been supporters of the collective security agreement. (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 1315 GMT, 27 Aug 98; FBIS-UMA-98-240) Conspicuously not 
included in this program are the members of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova).  
 
At a meeting of members of the Interparliamentary Union, a new coordination 
body, the Eurasia Group, was created. The group is tasked with formulating a 
"common stance" on parliamentary issues within the CIS, said Yegor Stroev, 
head of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. He also intimated that such efforts 
within the assembly would allow the CIS to protect more successfully its interests 
in the world arena. (ITAR-TASS, 1612 GMT, 6 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-249)  
 
Despite the recent economic and political crises within Russia, it is apparent that 
Russia is continuing to assert itself as the primary player in the CIS. In fact, in a 
recent interview, CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky emphatically stated 
that each of the 12 member states' presidents "clearly understands that Russia is 
absolutely invaluable for everyone, without exception, for all the CIS states, and 
that it has an absolute priority." (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 1018 GMT, 2 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-245) With the confirmation of Primakov as Russian prime 
minister, it is not implausible that Russia will even more aggressively pursue CIS 
cooperation efforts in order to maintain its supremacy within the CIS. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
First, the bad news... 
Ukraine effectively devalued the hryvnya on 4 September, as the Russian 
economic crisis took its toll. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Tigipko announced 
that the government would widen the hryvnya's fluctuation corridor to 2.5-3.5 
from 1.8-2.25. Ukrainian finance experts are predicting that the hryvnya will lose 
30-40 percent of its value against the dollar before the crisis is over. (Agence-
France Oresse North European Service, 1556 GMT, 4 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
248) 
 
...Now, the good 
As expected, on 7 September the International Monetary Fund officially offered 
Ukraine an Extended Fund Facility loan, worth in excess of $2.2 billion. The 
money will be paid out in several tranches over the next three years, with 
approximately $250 million paid immediately, most likely to be used to help 
"prop-up" the hryvnya. (Radio Rossii Network, 0900 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-248) 
 
Following the IMF's decision, the World Bank announced $900 million in loans to 
be disbursed among four projects in Ukraine: farm restructuring, a coal industry 
project, a project aimed at fostering small- and medium-sized businesses, and a 
program for the financial sector. (Interfax, 1431 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
250) 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will not follow 
suit, however. The organization has announced that it is reassessing its projects 
of cooperation with Ukraine in the state sector. The EBRD Director for Ukraine, 
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Moldova and Armenia said the EBRD would rather deal with "enterprises in 
whose affairs the state does not interfere."(ITAR-TASS, 1345 GMT, 28 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-240) 
 
Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of the world 
Luzhkov was the star speaker, as ethnic Russians chanted, "Thank you, 
Luzhkov"and "Thank you, Russia." Moscow? Nope. This was Ukraine.  
 
On 26 August, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov rode into Sevastopol, decrying the 
"forcible Ukrainization of ethnic Russians" and vowing to oppose it everywhere in 
Crimea. The official reason for his visit was the opening of a Russian school built 
with the aid of the Moscow city government.  
 
He vowed to do everything possible "for Black Sea Fleet sailors to feel that 
Moscow and Russia care for them and to keep alive their hope that Sevastopol 
will be back in Russia one day." And, he explained that "The Russian city of 
Sevastopol must be protected from steps which are inconsistent with the 
traditions and standards recognized by the civilized world." (Interfax, 1120 GMT, 
26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-238) 
 
But don't worry, Ukraine. A spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry cleared 
up the whole situation. ITAR-TASS reported that Russia does not question 
Ukraine's ownership of Sevastopol. As evidence, the foreign ministry spokesman 
explained, "The territorial belonging of Sevastopol is not put to doubt." There. 
That explains it. (ITAR-TASS, 1215 GMT, 3 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-246) 
 
BELARUS 
Belarus to World Bank and IMF: Here's your hat, what's your hurry? 
The World Bank has announced plans to "lower its presence" in Belarus, a 
decision that, in effect, will result in the closure of the bank's only office in the 
country. David Phillips, the head of the World Bank office in Belarus, has left the 
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country, and according to Phillips there will be no replacement. During his final 
news conference, Phillips noted that not one of the reforms agreed to by Belarus 
in exchange for World Bank assistance has been implemented. (ITAR-TASS, 
1710 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-239) 
 
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka had no comment on Phillips' 
departure. However, during a 31 August interview, Lukashenka repeated his 
frequent assertion that Belarus would not depend on "injections" from 
international organizations, and responded angrily to rumors that representatives 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would leave Belarus. He said, "We have 
never had nor are we currently receiving anything from the IMF -- not a dollar or 
a cent. So it is up to them: If they want to leave -- please go, the airports are 
open, we have never closed them, let them go." The IMF office in Belarus, 
however, noted that the IMF has provided a total of $270 million in loans to the 
country. (Belapan, 1148 GMT, 31 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-244)  
 
Meanwhile, on 3 September, three days after Lukashenka's remarks, Belarusian 
Minister of Economics Uladizimir Shymaw expressed regret over the low level of 
international presence in Belarus. He told reporters in Minsk that foreign credits 
are necessary to integrate the Belarusian economy into "the world's economic 
ties." Shymaw said that Belarus received a total of $60.8 million in foreign loans 
over the first seven months of 1998, which is "only 17 percent of the sum planned 
for this year." He said that his government is attempting to attract a higher level 
of foreign investment by conducting dialogue with the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the IMF, and ... the World Bank. (Belapan, 
1450 GMT, 3 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-247) Good thing the airports are open. 
 
Russian crisis? No problem... 
Shortly after the onset of the Russian currency crisis, President Lukashenka told 
his countrymen not to worry. He said, "It will be harder for Ukraine..., but it will be 
a little bit easier for Belarus" because "it anticipated such turmoils and gradually 
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devalued the national currency." (ITAR-TASS, 2114 GMT, 28 Aug 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-240) 
 
...Well, maybe a little 
By 3 September the Belarusian ruble had lost 90 percent of its value against the 
dollar. On 1 September, the dollar was trading at BR110,000-120,000. On 3 
September, it was trading at BR200,000 to 230,000. (Belapan, 1255 GMT, 3 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-246)  
 
MOLDOVA 
Dniestr threatens to block nuclear fuel shipment 
As the stalemate over Dniestr's status continues, the Dniestr administration 
seems to have found an issue over which it can flex its muscles. The director of 
the Civil Defense Service of the breakaway Dniestr Republic, Valeriy Kireev, is 
warning that Dniestr residents will block the railways in order to stop reprocessed 
nuclear "tailings" (a type of waste) from traveling through the area on its way 
from Bulgaria to Russia.  
 
Just two weeks ago, the Dniestr administration reached an agreement with both 
Bulgaria and Russia which allowed "fresh"fuel to be sent from Eloctrostal City in 
Russia to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in Bulgaria. (Basapress, 1700 GMT, 
13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) However, Kireev is so far refusing to allow trains 
to transport the fuel's waste back to Russia. (Basapress, 1615 GMT, 26 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-238) According to the Moldovan deputy minister of environment 
protection, the waste is more dangerous than "fresh" fuel. (Basapress, 1700 
GMT, 13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) 
 
Although it is unclear whether Kireev has the support necessary to block the 
railways, the threat has apparently delayed the transport, which was scheduled 
to head back to Russia by the first week of September. 
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Ukrainian 'peacekeepers' welcomed 
The joint control commission for a settlement in Transdniestr announced on 26 
August that an agreement has been reached to bring Ukrainian "peacekeepers" 
into the security zone. The co-chairman of the commission, Vladimir Bodnar, 
called the decision a breakthrough, and said that Ukraine now becomes an 
"equal party" as a guarantor country of the peace effort. He also said that this 
move follows on a decision made at a 20 March meeting between the leaders of 
Moldova and Transdniestr, as well as Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and 
then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
 
There are currently over 2,000 peacekeepers in the security zone: 700 each from 
Moldova, Transdniestr and Russia. (Interfax, 1447 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-239) 
 
Comment 
It is important to note that buried in the report announcing this agreement is one 
sentence explaining that there will be a total of 10 Ukrainian "observers" 
operating in the security zone, traveling in four vehicles. That number -- and the 
fact that they will apparently not operate as "peacekeepers" -- brings into serious 
question statements claiming that Ukraine will now be an "equal party" in the 
issue.  
 
In fact, on 20 March, Ukrainian President Kuchma made it clear that, despite 
protestations to the opposite (particularly by Russia) Ukraine is not deeply 
involved in the "peacekeeping" process. After that meeting, Chernomyrdin said, 
"Russia and Ukraine, as guarantor countries, shall do everything to eliminate the 
problems existing between the sides." Kuchma responded, "The problem of 
introducing Ukrainian peacekeeping troops into the Dniestr region is not on the 
agenda." At that same meeting, Moldova and Dniestr agreed to lower gradually 
the number of peacekeepers in the security zone from their areas, leaving only 
"light, mobile patrol posts on the zone borders." (FBIS-SOV-98-079) There was 
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no mention of any reduction in the number of Russian troops. It would, therefore, 
appear to be important for Russia to be able to point to another country as deeply 
involved in the issue as it is. In reality, however, Ukraine does not fit the bill. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Kazakh economy to experience only limited effects of Russian crisis 
President Nazarbaev assured investors at a press conference in Almaty on 8 
September that Kazakhstan's economy should have little trouble withstanding the 
effects of Russia's financial crisis, due to the fact that its monetary system is 
entirely independent from Russia's. As further proof of Kazakhstan's financial 
stability, he stated that Kazakhstan has the highest ratio of foreign exchange 
reserves to money supply of any of the CIS countries, and that the government 
should be able to maintain its $2 billion gold and foreign exchange reserves until 
the end of the current year with the capital inflows that it expects over the next 
four months. The Russian crisis is even proving to be somewhat advantageous, 
by providing Kazakhstan with cheap Russian-made products. (Interfax, 1559 
GMT, 8 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-251) 
 
Consequently, Kazakhstan continues to offer a good investment climate, and 
President Nazarbaev has also pledged to sign additional agreements in 
September in order to provide foreign investors with further benefits. (Interfax, 
1559 GMT, 8 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-251) Earlier, on 1 September, at the 
convention of the Kazakh parliament's fourth session, the president also 
attempted to allay recent fears for Kazakhstan's political stability, by declaring 
that he had absolutely no plans to dismiss Prime Minister Nurlan Balgymbaev 
and his cabinet. (Interfax, 0734 GMT, 1 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-244)  
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Prime Minister Balgymbaev also addressed the Kazakh parliament on 1 
September, but on a slightly different note. He announced that, although the two 
countries' monetary systems were completely independent of one another and 
Kazakhstan possessed a financial rating one grade above Russia's, the Kazakh 
economy had still been affected by the crises in Southeast Asia and Russia. 
Kazakhstan's stock market had declined sufficiently so that the government had 
postponed the issuing of Eurobonds and the privatization of certain industrial 
firms, which had a negative effect on incoming state revenues. Agricultural 
production and exports had also declined from the previous year. Nonetheless, 
the prime minister gave his country's economy an overall positive rating, based 
on increases in foreign investment, GDP, and production. (Interfax, 0937 GMT, 1 
Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-244) 
 
Romania obtains share in Kazakh oil industry 
Romanian Prime Minister Radu Vasile recently reported that his government had 
agreed to lease two oil fields (34,000 square kilometers each) in Kazakhstan. 
Romania's national oil company, SNP PETROM, initially intends to invest $20 
million in oil prospecting. Under the current lease agreement the company may 
search for new oil deposits for a period of five years and then has 25 years to 
extract any oil that it has found. A certain percentage of the company's profits will 
go to the Kazakh state. (Azi, 3 Sep 98, p. 3; FBIS-EEU-98-251) 
 
Kazakh security services detain alleged Pakistani Wahhabis 
Sources in Kazakhstan's law enforcement agencies reported that six Pakistani 
citizens, alleged to be Wahhabi missionaries, had been detained by the National 
Security Committee's Dzhambul department. The Pakistanis were in Dzhambul 
Region (southern Kazakhstan bordering on Kyrgyzstan) to attend a Muslim 
conference. Kazakh authorities have charged the men with practicing missionary 
activity without accreditation by the government, as well as with violating 
Kazakhstan's temporary residence laws. Apparently the men had been ordered 
to leave the country three months earlier, but had not complied. The men were 
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scheduled to be expelled from Kazakh territory on 10 September. (Interfax, 1113 
GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-250) 
 
Comment 
Kazakhstan is now the fourth Central Asian republic to take up the banner of anti-
Wahhabism. Uzbekistan has already held a number of trials to prosecute alleged 
Wahhabis, and the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments have also detained a number 
of persons on charges of disseminating Muslim fundamentalism/Wahhabism. 
Since the Taliban have managed to gain control of northern Afghanistan, these 
four Central Asian regimes have intensified their anti-Muslim fundamentalist 
rhetoric, as well as adopting a fairly hostile stance vis-a-vis Pakistan, whose 
interior ministry supports the Taliban. The Uzbek and Tajik presidents have gone 
so far as to make speeches in which they have branded the Taliban as both 
Wahhabi/Muslim extremists and international terrorists whose goals include, at 
the very least, the political destabilization of Central Asia. The Taliban are far 
from a benign force, but their leaders have declared on a number of occasions 
that they seek only to bring all of Afghanistan under their control and have no 
designs on any part of Central Asia. Nonetheless, if the Central Asian leaders are 
able to convince their own publics, as well as members of the international 
community, that the Taliban do pose a threat to Central Asia, then it will be easier 
for them to justify the use of repressive measures against their own populations. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz banks halt Russian currency exchanges 
Due to the Russian ruble's rapid fall in value, most Kyrgyz banks, as well as 
central exchange offices, suspended all cash transactions in Russian currency 
on 19 August. The banks still permitted non-cash ruble transactions, however. 
The Kyrgyz som also experienced what financial experts termed a "soft" 
devaluation, in the wake of devaluations in the Russian ruble and Kazakh tenge. 
Since Russia and Kazakhstan are Kyrgyzstan's main trading partners, the Kyrgyz 
economy was bound to be negatively affected by their currency devaluations. 
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Moreover, there are also internal causes for the drop in the som: a deterioration 
in Kyrgyzstan's balance of trade and the fact that most of the payments on state 
securities fall due in September. (Vecherniy Bishkek, 20 Aug 98, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-
98-237) 
 
President Akaev signs decree for constitutional referendum 
On 1 September, President Akaev signed a decree on holding a nationwide 
referendum to approve a number of constitutional amendments. Later that 
evening, he appeared on national television in order to promote the 
amendments. He explained that they would help strengthen Kyrgyzstan's 
legislative branch, create equal opportunities for all types of ownership, and help 
ensure freedom of the press and freedom of speech, by prohibiting the adoption 
of all laws which would restrict these two freedoms. (Interfax, 0623 GMT, 2 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-245)  
 
One amendment would result in the increase of the Legislative Assembly from 33 
to 67 deputies (Interfax, 0623 GMT, 2 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-245), while 
decreasing the number of deputies in the Assembly of People's Representatives 
(the second chamber of the Kyrgyz parliament). Furthermore, 15 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly would be reserved only for parties which managed to 
garner at least five percent of all votes. The amendment would also require that 
those who wish to stand for election in the Assembly of People's Representatives 
must first establish a minimum three-year residency in the area that they choose 
to represent. (Kyrgyz Radio First Programme, 1400 GMT, 1 Sep 98; British 
Broadcasting Corporation/nexis) In the amendments to the Kyrgyz constitution 
passed by referendum in 1994, the Legislative Assembly is described as "a 
standing body elected to represent the interests of the republic's entire 
population," whereas the Assembly of People's Representatives "works in 
sessions and is elected to represent territorial interests." (Kyrgyz Radio First 
Program Network, 1500 GMT, 23 Sep 94; FBIS-SOV-94-186) President Akaev 
also advocates restricting parliamentary immunity, amid protests from some of 
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the deputies, who fear that such a restriction might result in the arbitrary arrest of 
some of some parliament members. The Kyrgyz parliament is drawing up its own 
set of constitutional amendments, which it plans to submit to President Akaev by 
5 October. (AP Worldstream, 2 Sep 1998; nexis) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Further evidence implicating Khudoiberdiev's group in mayor's murder 
General Ghafur Mirzoev, commander of Tajikistan's Presidential Guard, informed 
Interfax on 28 August that automatic weapons and ammunition which were used 
in the attack on Tursunzade's mayor, Nurullo Khairulloev, had been found on 
Uzbek territory. The discovery of these arms is considered further evidence that it 
was Col. Mahmud Khudoiberdiev's supporters who carried out the shooting of 
Mayor Khairulloev and five of his aides. Gen. Mirzoev also stated that several 
residents of Tursunzade had been detained on suspicion of having aided the 
mayor's attackers, and that it was unlikely that Khudoiberdiev's men would have 
known the mayor's schedule without help from someone in the town. (Interfax, 
0703 GMT, 28 Aug 98; FBIS-TOT-98-240) Tajik law enforcement officials also 
claimed to have identified a few of Khudoiberdiev's closest associates among the 
attackers, as well as information that two armed men had been detained by 
Uzbek border guards and police in Uzbekistan's Uzunskii District, as they 
attempted to cross the Tajik-Uzbek border on the day of the mayor's 
assassination. However, the Uzbek charge d'affaires to Tajikistan, Bakhtier 
Urdashev, denied that his country had provided refuge to any of Khudoiberdiev's 
supporters, or that any conclusive evidence had been found which could link 
Khudoiberdiev's men to Uzbekistan. He also stated that Uzbek authorities had 
joined the Tajik security services in their search for the mayor's attackers, in 
accordance with the terms of a cooperation treaty signed earlier this year 
between the two republics' internal affairs ministries. (ITAR-TASS, 1016 GMT, 30 
Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-242) 
 
UTO transfers UNMOT murder suspects to Dushanbe; UN resumes work 
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On 31 August, the Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network issued a report stating 
that three of the men who are suspected of having been involved in the fatal 20 
July assault on four UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 
representatives had been transported to Dushanbe by United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) forces and transferred to the custody of government law enforcement 
officials. The men were arrested by UTO authorities in territory controlled by the 
opposition. (Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network, 1200 GMT, 31 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-243) On 3 September, the UN secretary-general's special envoy to 
Tajikistan, Jan Kubis, responded by issuing a press release which stated that the 
UN mission was now ready to resume its full responsibilities in the supervision of 
the inter-Tajik peace process, including the repatriation of over 200 opposition 
forces who remain in Afghanistan. (Interfax, 0627 GMT, 3 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
246) The men are gathered near the Sherkhan-Bandar settlement on the Afghan-
Tajik border, which recently fell under the control of the Taliban. (Interfax, 0620 
GMT, 27 Aug 98; FBIS-UMA-98-239) 
 
Tajik economy suffers consequences of Russian ruble's devaluation 
The Russian ruble's devaluation has hit the Tajik economy hard, especially in the 
northern province (oblast') of Leninobod, where most transactions are carried out 
in Russian rubles. Tajikistan's own currency has dropped significantly in value 
over the past two weeks, although at official exchange offices and at the banks it 
was continuing to trade at the previous rate of 754 Tajik rubles to $1US as of 6 
September. On the black market, however, the Tajik ruble's value declined 
sharply, trading at 1,032 to $1US as of 6 September. Prices of manufactured 
goods and food rose substantially. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 
GMT, 6 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-249) 
 
On 9 September, the National Bank of Tajikistan issued a statement warning 
people against conducting market transactions in Russian currency. Bank 
officials fear that there are those who might be tempted to buy large quantities of 
Russian rubles, exchange them for Tajik currency to buy US dollars and invest 
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them outside the country. This would inflict even more damage on Tajikistan's 
already beleaguered economy. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0820 GMT, 9 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-252)  
 
Comment 
Tajikistan's economy and the value of its currency are still irrevocably connected 
to the Russian economy, and therefore are very much dependent on Russia's 
financial well-being. The Russian government finances a good portion of 
Tajikistan's budget, including its military expenditures. To make matters worse, 
many Tajik citizens do not appear to have developed much confidence in their 
own currency, and often prefer to carry out their transactions in hard currency. 
The fact that official exchange rates have remained stable is of little significance; 
most currency trading is probably conducted on the black market, which is 
extremely sensitive to negative news and/or rumors about the country's financial 
state of affairs. Most residents of Tajikistan also prefer to handle all their 
transactions in cash, whether they are buying food, manufactured goods, or 
paying rent. Consequently, Russia's economic crisis is likely to have a 
devastating effect on the Tajik economy. This does not bode well for President 
Rahmonov's recently declared war on corruption in government organs and in 
the military. Many government and military officials have likely been engaging in 
illegal activities in order to make ends meet; now, as the real value of the Tajik 
ruble falls and prices rise, they may become even more dependent on the 
income from their illegal transactions, and will not react well to President 
Rahmonov's threatened crackdown. The situation may become particularly acute 
among those who receive their salaries in Russian rubles: the 25,000 Russian 
troops and border guards, a number of Tajik border guards, and civilians who 
work for Russian enterprises. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
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Officials optimistic about economy 
The degree to which neighboring countries suffer from Russia's economic woes 
will reflect not only the soundness of their macroeconomic policies but also the 
level of economic autonomy they have achieved in the last five years. So far, the 
three Caucasian states have not been affected in any substantial way. Armenian 
Prime Minister Armen Darbinian told reporters that Russia's financial crisis 
should not damage the Armenian economy. Armenia does not suffer from the 
debilitating tax collection shortfalls and budget deficits that have plagued the 
Russian economy. (Noyan Tapan, 0500 GMT, 29 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-242) 
Although some black market currency exchanges have sprung up in Azerbaijan, 
the finance minister, Fikret Yusifov, said the currency remains at the normal level 
of 3,900 to 3,920 manats to the dollar. (Interfax, 1731 GMT, 9 Sep 98; FBIS-98-
252) Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze told listeners that an economic 
commission convened by his government in response to the Russian crisis found 
no reason to expect a devaluation of the Georgian lari. (Radio Tbilisi Network, 
0602 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-250) In fact, Georgia has substantially 
recovered from the lows of 1994, so that the rate of inflation for 1997 was 7.5 
percent even as average wages increased. (ITAR-TASS, 1830 GMT, 5 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
 
ARMENIA 
More complications in relations with Turkey 
The war over Nagorno-Karabakh, the resulting Turkish embargo against 
Armenia, and the latter's all-out thrust to obtain international recognition for the 
"genocide" of 1915 have so poisoned Armenian-Turkish relations that even 
relatively minor issues are taken very seriously by the regional press. Turkey's 
President Suleyman Demirel invited Robert Kocherian, the Armenian president, 
to Ankara to celebrate Turkey's 75th anniversary in late October. So far the 
Armenian side has not replied. (Snark, 1420 GMT, 28 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
241) In the past Armenia sent much lower level officials to other regional forums 
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hosted by Turkey or Azerbaijan. The Armenian president stated that his country 
does not harbor Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) bases on its territory, as has 
been repeatedly alleged by Azeri and Turkish sources. To dispel that claim 
Kocharian invited Turkey to send monitors to Armenia. At the same time he 
refused to label the PKK a terrorist organization, saying instead that their cause 
should be approached with understanding. (Snark, 0600 GMT, 2 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-245) A day earlier the president's press secretary, Kasiya Abgarian, 
accused Turkey of influencing the election of the patriarch of the Armenian 
Apostolic Church in Constantinople and discriminating against the Armenian 
football and chess teams. (Snark, 1300 GMT, 1 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-245) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Air time and campaign funding for all candidates 
All six presidential candidates standing in Azerbaijan's 11 October election will 
have the opportunity to broadcast their message on television. Every contender 
will have 12 free appearances, each one lasting one-half hour. On 4 October all 
the candidates will participate in a two-hour press conference. On the eve of the 
elections each candidate will have 10 minutes more. In addition, each candidate 
will receive an equivalent of $15,000 for campaign funding. (ITAR-TASS, 0022 
GMT, 1 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-244) These measures signal the degree to which 
Aliev wishes to placate the opposition and win international approval of the 
elections.  
 
TRACECA summit adopts Baku Declaration 
TRACECA, the EU-sponsored conference on restoring the "Silk Road" routes 
between Asia and Europe through the Caucasus, approved the Baku Declaration 
and the Final Communique on 8 September. The representatives of 33 countries 
and 12 international organizations in attendance supported nine interconnected 
transportation projects outlined in the declaration. Azerbaijan reserved the right 
to contravene an article of the main document which guarantees the unrestricted 
transport of goods to Armenia. (RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 15 Sep 98) The 
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agreements regulate transport between the countries and aim at developing 
economic relations among them. It also creates an interstate commission with a 
permanent secretariat headquartered in Baku. (Turan, 1600 GMT, 8 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-251) 
 
GEORGIA 
US ship visits Poti, Georgian border guards reclaim frontier 
The US Sixth Fleet flagship LaSalle arrived at Georgia's Black Sea port Poti on 
15 September. In part to forestall any negative Russian reaction, President 
Shevardnadze described the event as a normal occasion which should not be 
seen in the context of the Cold War. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 15 Sep 98) 
The event's significance, especially in the context of last week's Silk Road 
conference, lies in Poti's strategic position on the oil transit route to Turkey and 
Ukraine. The event followed closely on the transfer of the coast guard from 
Russian to Georgian forces on 31 August. According to an agreement reached 
with the Russian side in June, all the border installations will be transferred to 
Georgian border guards. Other installations awaiting transfer in the next few 
months include the Akhalkalaki checkpoint on the Armenian-Georgian border. 
(Interfax, 1108 GMT, 2 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-245) Last month this region was 
the site of a standoff between a division of the Georgian army and a local 
Armenian militia. (See Digest, Vol. III, No. 12) The matter of Russian military 
bases remains under discussion. A meeting between Georgian Defense Minister 
David Tevzade and his Russian counterpart, Igor Sergeev, in late August 
produced the decision to resolve the question in light of a future document, a 
"concept of bilateral military cooperation." (ITAR-TASS, 1937 GMT, 27 Aug 98; 
FBIS-UMA-98-239) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Unknown 
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Foreign military moves rattle sabers and Baltic leaders 
Baltic leaders were watching closely as unexpected military activity occurred 
near their borders. While the activity ended without incident, there were enough 
occurrences to make the Baltic states understandably quite jumpy, especially 
given the turmoil in Russia. 
 
Over 1,000 Russian paratroopers, along with 20 transport aircraft IL-76, 40 
armored vehicles and artillery, held joint exercises in the Pskov region in mid-
August. Although the region borders Estonia and Latvia, Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman Valeri Nesterushkin described the exercises as too unimportant to 
warrant neighbor notification. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1000 
GMT, 25 Aug 98). In contrast to Nesterushkin's perspective, Latvian foreign 
ministry press secretary Andrejs Pildegovics said the maneuvers were the 
biggest Russian military tactical exercises near the Latvian border since Latvian 
independence in 1991. (Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 18 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-230) 
 
Lithuania complained about not being informed of recent Russian Baltic Fleet 
maneuvers, during which the fleet practiced shooting its new S-300 PS surface-
to-air missiles (with a range of 150-200 km). The fleet, based in the adjacent 
Russian exclave Kaliningrad, reportedly is the only military unit equipped with the 
missiles. The fleet's air defense chief, Maj. Gen. Fedor Krisanov, described the 
missiles as accurate and powerful. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1700 
GMT, 22 Aug 98) He did not elaborate on why the fleet would need such 
missiles. 
 
At the end of August, a Belarusian warplane violated Lithuanian air space. 
Lithuanian officials were investigating how far into Lithuanian territory the plane 
flew (ELTA, 1021 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-238); Belarusian Minister of 
Defense Aleksandr Chiumakov said he had not heard of the incident. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1000 GMT, 27 Aug 98). 
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More than likely, the abovementioned events constituted attempts to rattle both 
sabers and Baltic leaders. Still, as NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
General Wesley Clark reportedly told Estonian President Lennart Meri during a 
meeting in Tallinn, Russian armed forces should not be underestimated. 
According to a presidential spokesman, General Clark reminded Meri that 
Russian soldiers were of a very high caliber, and no one should lose sight of that 
despite the current financial/morale crisis the military is facing. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 5 Sep 98) 
 
LATVIA 
Citizens want say on proposed amendments 
All Latvian citizens will have the chance to vote on the fate of the proposed 
amendments to the citizenship law, after an incredibly successful signature 
campaign brought sweeping support for a referendum. According to the Central 
Election Commission, 226,530 signatures were collected; 131,145 were needed. 
 
The amendments, strongly recommended by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the international community, would grant 
citizenship to children born in independent Latvia and would close naturalization 
windows. Non-citizens would still be required to pass tests on Latvian laws, 
history and language. The signature petition began at the instigation of the 
nationalist For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK parliamentary faction, a 
longtime opponent of any easing of citizenship requirements. The referendum will 
be put before voters at the same time as the parliamentary elections scheduled 
for 3-4 October. (Interfax, 1603 GMT, 27 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-239) 
 
According to President Guntis Ulmanis, the success of the signature drive could 
be attributed to resentment at international pressure to change the law. "[W]e are 
able by ourselves to decide our fate.... We need [international] support, 
but...[other countries] will reach only the opposite effect if they attempt to force 
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people" to make immediate changes, Ulmanis said in a radio interview. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1224 GMT, 24 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-236) 
 
OSCE High Commissioner for Human Rights and National Minorities Max van 
der Stoel continues to see a need for the citizenship law amendments. (Radio 
Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 25 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-237) "I hope the Latvian 
people will comprehend what these amendments imply and what they don't 
imply," he said after a meeting with Ulmanis. Despite claims from For the 
Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK that the passage of the amendments would put 
the country at risk, Stoel said the approximately 18,000 children aged seven and 
younger who would be affected by the amendments should not endanger the 
Latvian people or language. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1800 GMT, 
25 Aug 98) 
 
Meanwhile, other members of the international community have sent signals to 
Latvia that defeat of the referendum would have international repercussions. At a 
meeting of the foreign ministers of the Nordic Council, Sweden's Lena Hjelm-
Wallen came right out and said so. (Radio Riga Network, 1500 GMT, 25 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-239) According to Baltic News Service (1600 GMT, 4 Sep 98), 
President Bill Clinton in a letter to Ulmanis expressed the conviction that the 
enactment of the amendments is very important for Latvian efforts to speed up 
integration into international institutions. He reportedly described the new law as 
a key element that could give new impetus for the development of relations 
between Latvia and the United States. US Ambassador to NATO Alexander 
Vershbow said the fate of the amendments had become a yardstick against 
which further progress would be measured. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1600 
GMT, 2 Sep 98) "We hope there is a good and informed debate on the 
amendments and Latvians make the right choice. This will have an effect on 
Latvia's integration into Western institutions," Vershbow said. 
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While Latvians apparently seek international support and security, they are less 
willing to accept international recommendations and pressure. Prime Minister 
Guntis Ulmanis, a supporter of the referendum and the man at whose suggestion 
the signature drive began, seemed to confirm Ulmanis' view of the motivation 
behind the referendum when he responded to international reaction to the drive's 
success. "These elements of political pressure, no doubt, create a rather 
negative impression to the people," he said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily 
Report, 1457 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248) It remains to be seen whether 
Latvian pride will stand in the way of Latvian progress. 
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